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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of international business transactions. The prolifera-
tion of foreign goods imported into the United States and American
products exported abroad, as well as the rise in multinational business
cartels and agreements, has led to a rise in litigation in American
courts involving foreign parties.' Litigation becomes more compli-
cated and expensive when documents and witnesses are located in
other countries.2 Hiring foreign counsel, translators, and interpreters,
as well as travel, is expensive. Moreover, American attorneys find
themselves working in legal systems quite different from their own.
The emergence of these problems has led to the adoption of laws and
treaties designed to alleviate some of these difficulties by promoting
cooperation among nations. 3
In 1893, the Netherlands government established the Hague
Conference on International Law. 4 The Hague Conventions on Civil
Procedure of 1905 and 1954 were early efforts on the part of the
Hague Conference and the signatory nations to bring about coopera-
tion between nations in the area of international litigation.5 The
United States acted through observers at the 1956 and 1960 sessions
1. The "unparalleled expansion of international trade and travel in recent decades" re-
sulted in a "substantial increase in litigation with foreign aspects," and created a need for an
"international agreement to set up a model system to bridge differences between the common
law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad." LETTER OF SUBMITTAL FROM
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT REGARDING THE EVIDENCE CONVEN-
TION, SEN. EXEC. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. VI (1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323, 324 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LErER OF SUBMITrAL]. See also Amram, The Proposed Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651, 651 (1969).
2. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note i.
3. See infra notes 4-22 and accompanying text.
4. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 1, at VI, in 12 I.L.M. at 324.
5. Amram, Rapport explicatifde M. Ph W Amram, AcRES ET DOCUMENTS, 1 th Sess.,
vol. IV, Conference de la Haye de droit international prive, at 202 (1970).
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of the Conference, and participated as a member for the first time at
the Tenth Session of the Conference in 1964.6 At the 1964 Confer-
ence, the delegates revised Chapter I of the 1905 and 1954 Conven-
tions and adopted the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Ser-
vice Convention).7 Following the adoption and general acceptance of
the Service Convention, the United States suggested approaching the
problems involved with taking evidence abroad.8 The Eleventh Ses-
sion of the Conference, building on and revising Chapter II of the
1954 Civil Procedure Convention, 9 drafted and approved the multilat-
eral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters Io (Evidence Convention) in October, 1968."1
The Evidence Convention sets forth the procedures for taking
evidence in "civil or commercial"'12 matters involving the signatory
states.' 3 Prior to its adoption, differences in various legal systems
around the world gave rise to conflicts and problems in conducting
multinational litigation.' 4 Diplomatic channels, which were some-
times used to obtain evidence, were usually slow. In addition, liti-
6. LETTER OF SUBMIITAL, supra note 1, at V, in 12 I.L.M. at 324.
7. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter cited as Service Convention]. The United States Senate gave its
consent to ratification on April 14, 1967. Id.
8. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 1, at V, in 12 I.L.M. at 324; Report of United
States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8
I.L.M. 785, 804-05 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Report].
9. Report, supra note 8, at 805; P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVEN-
TION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, SEN.
ExEc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 327, 327 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as EXPLANATORY REPORT].
10. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231,
codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Evidence Convention].
"The Convention received the unanimous approval of the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association at the meeting in Dallas in 1969." Amram, United States Ratification of the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 105 n.6 (1973).
The Evidence Convention was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 84 to 0. 118 CONG. REC.
20,623 (1972).
11. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 1, at V, in 12 I.L.M. at 324.
12. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
13. The following states are parties: Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. 7 MARTINDALE-HUB-
BELL LAW DIRECTORY 12, 14 (1984).
14. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 1, at VI, in 12 I.L.M. at 324. "The willingness of
the Conference to proceed promptly with work on the evidence convention is perhaps attribu-
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gators were often frustrated by the use of these diplomatic channels
because the evidence which was eventually gathered was generally in-
adequate, and sometimes delivered in a form that would not be admis-
sible in an American court.15 The Evidence Convention is designed to
correct some of these problems by increasing the use of letters of re-
quest, expanding the powers of diplomatic consuls, introducing com-
missioners into the system, ensuring that evidence is gathered in a
legally admissible form, and preserving the favorable practices of the
country responding to the request. 16
The United States has attempted to encourage liberal coopera-
tion between international courts.1 7 For example, Congress enacted
section 1782 of title 28 of the United States Code, which allows for-
eign tribunals the right to request liberal discovery against American
parties to foreign suits.'8 It was hoped that other countries would
table in large measure to the difficulties encountered by courts and lawyers in obtaining evi-
dence abroad from counr des [sic] with markedly different legal systems." Id.
15. Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for
Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 Iwr'L LAW. 35, 37 (1979):
[Attorneys] have frequently engaged in legal tourism rather than have recourse to the
traditional procedure of international letters rogatory. Indeed, in the absence of a
specific judicial assistance treaty between France and the United States, letters roga-
tory, transmitted at a leisurely pace through diplomatic channels and executed in
accordance with the rules laid down in the French Code of Civil Procedure, have
generally provided American litigants with evidence of little or no practical value
before courts in the United States.
Id. See also United States Ratification, supra note 10, at 106 ("The Convention effectively
resolves the troublesome problem of assuring that the evidence taken will be effectively useful
in the tribunal where it is to be introduced.").
16. The forty-two articles of the Convention are divided into three Chapters: letters of
request, consuls and commissioners, and general provisions. According to the Department of
State, the Convention is designed to:
. Make the employment of letters of request a principal means of obtaining evi-
dence abroad;
2. Improve the means for securing evidence abroad by increasing the powers of
consuls and by introducing in the civil law world, on a limited basis, the concept of
the commissioner;
3. Provide means for securing evidence in the form needed by the court where the
action is pending; and
4. Preserve all more favorable and less restrictive practices arising from internal
law, internal rules of procedure and bilateral or multilateral conventions.
LETrER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 1, at VI, in 12 I.L.M. at 324. See also Convention on
Taking of Evidence Abroad, S. EXEC. REP. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972).
17. Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters-A Comparison with Federal Rules Procedures, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 365,
368 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BROOKLYN].
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). Section 1782 provides in pertinent part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. . . .To the extent that the order
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reciprocate by granting similar American discovery requests, 19 but the
hoped-for reciprocity did not materialize. 20 American discovery prac-
tices are virtually unknown in some foreign judicial systems, or exist
in more limited scopes in other nations. 21 By adopting the Evidence
Convention, the United States hoped to equalize the degree of judicial
cooperation among nations. 22 As the situation stands now, an Ameri-
can party to a suit in an American court, or in a foreign court, is
subject to very liberal discovery requests in comparison to parties
from other nations. 23 A foreign defendant, by contrast, may raise the
Evidence Convention and substantially limit the amount of discovery
sought by American parties. 24
The question arises, therefore, whether a foreign corporation or
individual may bring suit in an American court, seek liberal discovery
against a United States defendant, and yet limit discovery against it-
self under the Evidence Convention. Has that corporation or individ-
ual, by subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the American federal or
state court system, waived its rights under the Evidence Convention?
This Comment examines whether the terms of the Evidence Conven-
tion may be used and interpreted to expand the rights of American
parties against foreign nationals.
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
A. Historical Background and Intent
Many difficulties arise in international litigation as a result of ba-
sic philosophical and procedural differences between common and
does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the doc-
ument or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
For a discussion of the purpose and substance of this statute, see Amram, The Proposed Inter-
national Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A. J. 650 (1965).
19. BROOKLYN, supra note 17, at 368.
20. Id.
21. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 9, at 15, in 12 I.L.M. at 329.
22. Amram, supra note 2, at 655.
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. Id. Discovery abroad is limited for a number of reasons. American litigants may not
be able to afford the cost of hiring translators or of traveling to another country. A more
serious problem arises, however, as a result of the actual use of the Evidence Convention. The
Convention generally requires the intervention of foreign judicial entities. Foreign courts are
often reluctant to grant the discovery requests of American counsel because such liberal re-
quests would not be granted in a proceeding in their own country. If the parties to the suit do
not have to proceed through the Evidence Convention, and instead can utilize the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the applicable state statutes, the scope of evidence available to all
litigants would be essentially equal.
[Vol. 7:409
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civil law systems. 25 Because of the liberal attitudes toward discovery
in the United States, foreign parties to suits here and abroad have a
much wider range of potential sources of evidence in the United
States than Americans have abroad. 26 This disparity could put an
American plaintiff or defendant at a disadvantage.
The American concept of discovery derives from the English
Chancery Courts.27 Although the English and American systems
have common origins, the procedures and philosophies of the two na-
tions have developed to the point that they now incorporate very dif-
ferent opinions about the extent of allowable discovery. 2 Pretrial
discovery in the United States is not merely commonplace, it is
mandatory. 29 Discovery in the American system is designed to assist
a litigant in preparing his case.30 It is considered cost effective and
25. "Due to these conceptual and linguistic factors, it sometimes is difficult to determine
the extent to which foreign reluctance to cooperate in American pre-trial discovery procedures
is the result of misunderstandings and the extent to which it is based on a dislike for the
philosophies which underlie them." Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use
in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 5, 6 (1979). As one commentator has noted,
The basic problem is easy to state. How does one legal system adjust its procedural
mechanisms both to provide an effective response to the needs of another legal sys-
tem and to obtain a meaningful response to its needs from that system when one or
more of the procedural norms and philosophical bases upon which the two nations
operate differ drastically?
The potential problems this may create are overwhelming. Miller, International Cooperation
in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommoda-
tion in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1072 (1965).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982); see generally Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 608, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 86, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441 (H.L.
1977) (Wilberforce, L.J.) ("the United States pre-trial procedure, as laid down in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and particularly rules 26 and 30 .... give wide powers, wider than
exist in England, of pre-trial discovery against persons not parties to a suit.").
27. Collins, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in England for Use in
Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27, 27 (1979).
28. Id. "English lawyers familiar with American litigation have become concerned, if
not appalled, at the consequences of the developments in the United States, especially in major
international litigation." Id.
29. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (attorneys for plaintiff sought,
through interrogatories, statements made by witnesses to defense attorneys concerning the
death of a seaman).
30. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 9, at 15, in 12 I.L.M. at 329; Reports on the
Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1423 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Special Commission Report]:
Discovery is designed (1) to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the
truth and in checking and preventing perjury; (2) to provide means of detecting and
exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses; (3) to inform the parties in
advance of actual trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby en-
couraging settlements; (4) to expedite litigation; (5) to safeguard against surprise; (6)
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efficient. 31 It allows both sides equal access to all pertinent informa-
tion.32 In contrast, English courts, as well as the courts of most other
nations, view American discovery requests as "fishing expeditions,"
and are therefore either reluctant to comply with them or refuse alto-
gether to do so. 33
In civil and most common law nations, pretrial discovery is lim-
ited or nonexistent.34 Evidence is gathered in those countries only for
trial, as opposed to being used at the early investigatory stages of the
case, and sometimes can only be gathered in the actual course of a
trial.35 As a result, American litigants will probably only be allowed
to obtain specific evidence which they can prove will eventually be
used in the trial of the action; broad document requests which are
made with the hope that they may lead to relevant, specific informa-
tion might not be granted. 36 Frustrated by these limitations and by
the slow progress of discovery requests through diplomatic channels,
attorneys have occasionally resorted to visiting foreign countries and
gathering evidence themselves in their own way.37 This has been
to encourage extrajudicial settlement and compromise; (7) to simplify and narrow the
issues; and (8) to expedite and facilitate the ultimate trial.
31. See Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1423.
32. Id. (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958)).
33. Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1421. One English court, prior to the
adoption of the Evidence Convention, stated its attitude toward American discovery this way:
[I]t is plain that that principle [of discovery] has been carried very much further in
the United States of America than it has been carried in this country. In the United
States of America it is not restricted merely to obtaining a disclosure of documents
from the other party to the suit, but there is a procedure, which might be called a
pre-trial procedure, in the courts of the United States which allows interrogation not
merely of the parties to the suit, or whom it may be thought may be witnesses in the
suit but also of persons who may be witnesses in the suit, and which requires them to
answer questions and produce documents. The questions would not necessarily be
restricted to matters which were relevant in the suit, nor would the production be
necessarily restricted to admissible evidence, but they might be such as would lead to
a train of inquiry which might itself lead to relevant material.
Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 643-44, [1956] 1 All E.R. 549,
551.
34. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 9, at 15, in 12 I.L.M. at 329.
35. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 608, [1978] 2
W.L.R. 81, 86, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441-42 (I.L. 1977) (Wilberforce, L.J.).
36. Rio Tinto, 1978 A.C. at 609-10, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 87-88, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 442-43
(Wilberforce, L.J.); Jacob & Jacob, Civil Procedure Including Courts, ANN. SURV. OF COM-
MON EALTh L. 473, 473-74 (1977) ("In Ontario, as well as in England, an order in response
to letters rogatory from a foreign court will only be made for the taking of testimony in the
nature of proof for the trial, and not for the purpose of testimony for discovery [citations
omitted].").
37. Borel & Boyd, supra note 15, at 37.
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called "legal tourism. ' 38 In some countries, attorneys who take infor-
mation and foreign citizens who give information in this way may be
subject to criminal sanctions.3 9 The only safe avenues open to Ameri-
can and other non-nationals abroad are, therefore, official diplomatic
and judicial channels.4°
Another restriction sometimes imposed by foreign courts is the
prohibition against taking discovery from all but parties to the case.
4'
Unlike United States courts which may assert jurisdiction over indi-
viduals who possess evidence or testimony which might be relevant to
the case,42 foreign courts, such as the English, often restrict the pre-
trial production of documents from the appearance of nonparty
witnesses.
43
Many countries not only wish to protect individuals under their
jurisdiction, but particular types of documents as well." In Switzer-
land, for example, all banking documents are restricted and are not
subject to disclosure for discovery abroad.45 Even when these docu-
ments are relevant to the trial, American counsel do not have access
38. Id.
39. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Re-
form, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 520 n.12 (1953):
Art. 271 of the Swiss Penal Code, as translated, reads in part: "Whoever, on
Swiss territory, without being authorized so to do, takes on behalf of a foreign gov-
ernment any action which is solely within the province of a [Swiss] government au-
thority or a [Swiss] government official, whoever does anything to encourage such
action,. . . shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the penitentiary."
40. Carter, supra note 25, at 7 ("American counsel conducting an unsupervised deposi-
tion or the inspection of documents in American fashion in a Civil-Law country may be im-
properly performing a public judicial act which is seen as infringing the foreign state's judicial
sovereignty unless special authorization has been granted.") See also Miller, supra note 25, at
1077: "This reluctance to permit a foreign litigant or official to perform a judicial act within
Switzerland without official intervention also is reflected in the way the Swiss government has
construed some of the international agreements it has entered into dealing with the service of
foreign judicial documents." Several factors contribute to Switzerland's reluctance to allow
foreign individuals to conduct quasi-judicial proceedings in their country, namely, "its federal
system of government, a strong conception of sovereignty, and a national policy of neutrality."
Id. at 1074.
41. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 608, [1978] 2
W.L.R. 81, 86, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441 (H.L. 1977) (Vilberforce, L.J.).
42. See id. at 608, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 86, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 441-42 (Wilberforce, L.J.).
43. BROOKLYN, supra note 17, at 405.
44. See generally Carter, supra note 25, at 7. Under article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code,
it is a crime to release business secrets. A violation could result in imprisonment and a fine.
Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 515, 520 n.13 (1953).
45. See generally Jones, supra note 44, at 520 n. 13.
1984] 415
416 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 7:409
to them.46 Some countries, wary of document requests in specific tri-
als, have passed specific laws prohibiting their disclosure.47 For ex-
ample, as a result of American proceedings investigating an
international uranium cartel, several nations passed statutes designed
to prevent discovery of potentially relevant documents. 48 The parties
then went to England, where the House of Lords eventually decided
the issue of disclosure. 49 The English Court of Appeal had decided
not to grant the American letters of request for various reasons, in-
cluding the concern that the request was merely a "fishing expedi-
tion."' 50 The case was then considered by the House of Lords. In Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,51 the English House
of Lords also objected to the American discovery request. The British
high court, although wishing to cooperate with the American court,52
felt the discovery request was too broad because it was not sufficiently
specific and it put British citizens at risk of criminal antitrust
charges. 5
3
46. Id. at 520 n.13:
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, as translated, reads in part: "A person who,
through spying, secures a manufacturing or business secret, in order to make it acces-
sible to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a private business
enterprise, or to their agents, a person who makes accessible a manufacturing or
business secret to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a private
business enterprise, or to their agents, shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious
cases in the penitentiary. In addition a fine may be imposed."
Banking secrets are also protected. Id.
47. Carter, supra note 25, at 7. Examples of this type of legislation are: "the Province of
Ontario's Business Records Protection Act, the United Kingdom's Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act, and Canada's 1976 Uranium Information Security Regulations."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
48. See generally id Such legislation at times causes American litigants to go to great
lengths in search of necessary documents which may be located abroad: "[Westinghouse has]
tried and failed in Australia, Canada, France and South Africa [to acquire documents to prove
the conspiracy]. We are told that in those countries regulations have been passed so as to
forbid the documents of the [uranium] cartel being disclosed. Now Westinghouse seeks to get
them from Rio Tinto in England." In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litiga-
tion M.D.L. Docket No. 235, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 435, [1977] 3 All E.R. 703, 707 (C.A.
1977) (Denning, M.R.), rev'd, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C.
547, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, [1978] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
49. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation M.D.L. Docket No.
235, [1977] 3 All E.R. 703, 707, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 435 (Denning, M.R.).
50. Id
51. [1978] A.C. 547, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977).
52. Id. at 618, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 95, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 449 (Dilhome, L.J.).
53. Id. at 610, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 88, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 443 (Wilberforce, L.J.) ("My
Lords, I have much doubt whether the letters rogatory ought not to be rejected altogether.
They range exceedingly widely and undoubtedly extend into areas, access to which is forbid-
den by English law.").
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The result in Rio Tinto illustrates the difficulties encountered in
international litigation. Although Rio Tinto is a post-Evidence Con-
vention case, and therefore was not a consideration in the drafting of
the Convention, it makes clear that the problems which existed before
the ratification still exist to some extent today. The attitude among
signatory nations is cooperative, but protective. Old concerns of judi-
cial sovereignty and preservation of internal court procedures still re-
main54 as a roadblock to gathering evidence in foreign tribunals.
The reluctance of courts to comply with document requests of
another nation which would not be allowed in their own nation is
understandable. Familiar and time-tested internal procedures are ob-
viously preferred over the procedural dictates of a letter rogatory
from a foreign court. 55 In addition, these attitudes are deeply rooted
in national concepts of judicial sovereignty and a local court's juris-
diction over and protection of its own citizens.56 Procedures followed
in a civil law system especially are very different from those practiced
in a common law jurisdiction, and the United States even has a
number of variations from other common law states.57 In a civil law
system, evidence is gathered in court and the judge presides over the
proceedings. 58 Attorneys take a very passive role in the trial.
59
54. Carter, supra note 25, at 6-7. "The clash of perspectives is particularly intense in the
Civil-Law countries, where an American litigant encounters the doctrine of 'judicial sover-
eignty."' Id. at 6.
55. According to one commentator,
It is plain that the greatest obstacle to obtaining evidence in England is the
negative view of, if not the outright hostility to, American-style discovery on the part
of English lawyers and judges. This hostility permeates English attitudes and runs
through all of the cases in which there have been problems about obtaining evidence
in England.
Collins, supra note 27, at 29. Cf Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REV. 57,
58 (1967) (footnotes omitted): "Despite recent efforts to acquaint American jurists with foreign
procedural systems, American courts still distrust many procedures employed by foreign
courts. American courts are therefore reluctant to dismiss any case if dismissal would force
the parties to litigate abroad, particularly if the plaintiff is a domiciliary of this country." See
also COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS ON THE SERVICE OF PRO-
CESS, THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE AND LEGISLATION (prepared by D. McClean) (1979).
56. See generally Carter, supra note 25.
57. For a brief discussion of differences and difficulties which exist, see Edwards, Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 646 (1969).
58. Report, supra note 8, at 806. See also Borel & Boyd, supra note 15, at 36 (footnotes
omitted) ("At this stage, control of the evidence gathering process passes from the parties to
the judge, to whom the French Code of Civil Procedure grants broad and exclusive powers.").
59. "For the most part, however, the parties and their counsel are silent spectators, al-
lowed to speak only when they are requested or authorized to do so by the judge." Borel &
Boyd, supra note 15, at 37.
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Although a judge presides over American lawsuits, 6° American attor-
neys have far more freedom than their foreign counterparts in deter-
mining the scope and manner of discovery. In other countries, only
evidence relating specifically to the issues presented in court is consid-
ered relevant and discoverable; document searches common in the
United States, conducted with only the idea that relevant information
may be discovered, are not allowed.6' For an American court to re-
quest a foreign court to go beyond the limits of their judicial authority
is viewed as an infringement upon the foreign country's sovereignty.
62
An attorney attempting to conduct his own discovery outside judicial
channels, as some have been known to do, is of course an even more
blatant form of intrusion.63 The result of these philosophical differ-
ences is that American parties to lawsuits are still subject to the broad
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section
1782, while at the same time they have only limited access to informa-
tion located abroad and held by foreign parties to the suit.
The Hague Evidence Convention is an attempt to deal with the
conflicting judicial systems of the world and facilitate cooperation be-
tween judicial bodies.64 This is an open Convention, so that a number
of states have been able to sign in the years following the original
ratification. 65 The goal of the delegates to the Convention was to pro-
vide a framework for effective cooperation. 66
B. Evidence Convention Provisions
The Evidence Convention provides for three ways of taking evi-
dence abroad: through letters of request, by consular officers, or by
court appointed commissioners.67 Although the terms of the Conven-
tion are flexible, it was not the intention of the drafters that signatory
nations should overlook unappealing provisions of the Convention.
68
While the drafters were careful to avoid any escape clauses, 69 certain
60. Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1423.
61. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 A.C. 547, 608, [1978] 2
W.L.R. 81, 86, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441-42 (H.L. 1977) (Wilberforce, L.J.).
62. Carter, supra note 25, at 6-7.
63. Id. at 7.
64. See generally LETTER OF SUBMITrAL, supra note 1.
65. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 9, at 12, in 12 I.L.M. at 328.
66. See generally LETTER OF SUBMrrTAL, supra note 2; see also Explanatory Report,
supra note 9, at 11, in 12 I.L.M. at 327.
67. Evidence Convention, supra note 10.
68. See Report, supra note 8, at 810.
69. Id. ("It was the unanimous agreement of the delegations that no general 'escape
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significant terms were left undefined. 70 This is a potential source of
conflict when foreign and American courts begin to analyze and apply
the Convention. In addition, signatory states had the option of ratify-
ing the Convention with amendments, and several did. 7' These
amendments, therefore, might have the effect of allowing such leeway
in interpretation and procedure that the purpose of the Convention
could be obliterated.
One significant provision of the Convention for American law-
yers is article 23. This article allows a foreign tribunal to refuse to
execute a letter of request for the purpose of pretrial discovery. 72 The
article was added at the insistence of the British delegation, which
saw the American discovery system as a potential evil raising consid-
erable questions of the executing country's sovereignty and citizens'
rights.73 All states but the United States declared, pursuant to article
23 of the Convention, that they reserved the right not to grant re-
quests for pretrial discovery. 74 Article 23 of the Convention was ap-
parently not designed, however, to cut off all American discovery
before a trial by jury had commenced.75 The article was merely
clause' should be introduced which would nullify in practice the request for a special
procedure.")
70. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 9, at 13, in 12 I.L.M. at 328. For example, the
terms "judicial," "civil or commercial matters," or "obtain evidence" are not defined within
the body of the Convention. Id. See also Report, supra note 8, at 808.
71. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 33.
72. Article 23 provides: "A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification
or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of ob-
taining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." Evidence
Convention, supra note 10, art. 23.
73. Edwards, supra note 60, at 650-51:
Discovery, however, is not known to continental systems of law because there the
testimony is taken by the court and assistance is not given to the parties to the pro-
ceedings to obtain evidence. The majority of delegates of civil law countries there-
fore failed to appreciate, despite efforts by the United Kingdom delegation to explain
the dangers, that it is essential that countries should be able to refuse a request for
pre-trial discovery of a "fishing" nature or for the production of documents not di-
rectly required by a foreign court. It is believed, nevertheless, that the United King-
dom's interests are safeguarded by the provision in Article 23 that a contracting State
may declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery.
74. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.21 (5th Cir. 1985); Rio Tinto
Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 A.C. 547, 609, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 86, [1978] 1
All E.R. 434, 442 (H.L. 1977) (Wilberforce, L.J.); Special Commission Report, supra note 30,
at 1421.
75. Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1428. The United States delegation to
the Convention concluded that it "appears that when making this reservation the Contracting
States did not intend to refuse all requests for evidence submitted by the American judicial
authorities before the trial on the merits commenced before the jury." Id.
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designed to require "specific" document requests. 76 This avoids "fish-
ing expeditions" which are inconsistent with the laws of the foreign
country and a violation of the rights of the foreign party under its own
laws. 77 Apparently, there was some misunderstanding among some of
the delegates about the American discovery system.78 Certain dele-
gates to the Convention perceived the American system as allowing
discovery even in the absence of court proceedings of any sort;79 the
American delegate had to explain to them that discovery commences
only after the filing of the initial court papers, and not before8 0 Such
confusion may lead, of course, to a reluctance to fulfill American dis-
covery requests.
The actual effect of the Convention is "to provide a set of mini-
mum standards" with which contracting states agree to comply.81
Consistent with this philosophy, more liberal procedures adopted by
the states now or at sometime in the future are recognized.8 2 Article 9
allows the executing state to apply its own internal law "as to meth-
ods and procedures to be followed."83 If the requesting authority asks
for a certain procedure to be followed, however, that request should
76. Id. ("The reservation could reasonably be applied only in those cases where the lack
of specificity in the Letter of Request was such that it did not permit sufficient identification of
the documents to be produced or examined.") In fact, in the Rio Tinto case, the House of
Lords particularly objected to the lack of specificity in the request for documents. Rio Tinto
Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 A.C. 547, 610,644, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 88, 119,
[1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441, 470 (H.L. 1977) (Wilberforce, L.J. & Fraser, LJ.).
77. Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1421.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Commission explained:
These delegates were of the view that "pretrial discovery" meant some sort of a pro-
ceeding permitted under American law prior to the institution of a lawsuit; as one
delegate put it: "We understand that American lawyers can ask a court for permis-
sion to go on a broad fishing expedition, to determine whether there might be some
evidence somewhere which would support a lawsuit. Our courts will have no part of
such proceedings".
Id.
80. Special Commission Report, supra note 30, at 1423-24; See also supra note 30; Evi-
dence Convention, supra note 10, art. 1. The Convention itself provides an exception to this
rule, however; evidence or a statement may be obtained from a dying witness. The proceedings
in which the evidence is to be used, however, in such a case, must be "commenced or contem-
plated." EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 9, at 14, in 12 I.L.M. at 329.
81. LETTER OF SUBMrrTAL, supra note 1, at VI, in 12 I.L.M. at 324.
82. LETTER OF SUBMITrAL, supra note 1, at VI, X, in 12 I.L.M. at 324, 326; Evidence
Convention, supra note 20, art. 27(b).
83. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 9. That article provides:
The judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its own
law as to the methods and procedures to be followed.
However, it will follow a request of the requesting authority that a special
method or procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of
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be honored unless it is incompatible with the internal law of the exe-
cuting state.8 4
Under article 12 of the Convention, refusal to execute letters is
only allowed where (1) the "execution is not within the function of
the judiciary" or (2) the "state of execution considers that its sover-
eignty or security would be prejudiced." 85 The language used is again
very broad and is written in terms of cooperation. 86 If the requesting
authority asks for a certain procedure to be followed, the executing
authority will only deny that request if it is "incompatible" with local
law or "impossible" to perform.87 This article was discussed by the
drafters at length so that no confusion would arise.88 It was agreed
that "impossible" did not equal inconvenient:8 9 the higher standard
of an actual violation of the local law was required before a request
could be refused. In addition, if there are any problems with the letter
of request, the executing state is to notify the requesting state
promptly, with a letter of explanation.90 This allows the executing
state to correct the problem so that the letter can be reissued and the
request fulfilled. Further, a claim by the state that they have exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter is not an acceptable basis for re-
fusal.91 These efforts by the delegates to place severe limits on a
court's ability to refuse a request demonstrates that the Evidence
the State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its internal prac-
tice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties.
A Letter of Request shall be executed expeditiously.
84. Id.
85. LETTER OF SuBMrrrAL, supra note 1, at VIII, in 12 I.L.M. at 325; Evidence Conven-
tion, supra note 10, art. 12.
86. Article 12 states:
The execution of a Letter of Request may be refused only to the extent that-
(a) in the State of execution the execution of the Letter does not fall within the
functions of the judiciary; or
(b) the State addressed considers that its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced thereby.
Execution may not be refused solely on the ground that under its internal law
the State of execution claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
action or that its internal law would not admit a right of action on it.
Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 12.
87. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 9 (for text of Article 9, see supra note 83).
88. Report, supra note 8, at 810.
89. LETTER OF SuBMrrrAL, supra note 1, at VIII, in 12 I.L.M. at 325; Report, supra note
8, at 811.
90. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 13: "In every instance where the Letter is
not executed in whole or in part, the requesting authority shall be informed immediately
through the same channel and advised of the reasons."
91. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 12; LETTER OF SuBMrrrAL, supra note 1, at
VIII, in 12 I.L.M. at 325.
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Convention is designed to facilitate cooperation and produce evi-
dence, and not to put up hurdles for attorneys from the requesting
state. Clearly, the Evidence Convention is designed with compliance
in mind, through the easiest and most efficient means.92
Article 10 of the Convention provides procedures for compelling
the appearance of a witness or the production of requested docu-
ments.93 This maintains the force of the Convention by permitting
the executing country to use its internal law for enforcing orders. By
using the corrective measures of the executing state under article 10,94
the Convention maintains the spirit of article 9.
It is apparent from the purpose and background of the Conven-
tion that it was designed to make discovery easier, not more compli-
cated or technical. By providing a broad framework (albeit with
certain significant restricitons) for the taking of evidence abroad, the
drafters attempted to take into consideration the complexities of a
number of different judicial systems throughout the world. Problems
arise, however, for American parties because of article 23 and because
of foreign courts' continued reluctance to grant certain requests. The
same broad language in the Convention which enables it to be applied
in a number of very different judicial systems, in addition to the
amendments adopted by various signatory nations, provide potential
escape clauses to judicial officers reluctant to fulfill discovery requests
which are inconsistent with their own local concepts of litigation. 95
To avoid some of these potential complications, the issue of exactly
when the Evidence Convention must be applied is being litigated in
American courts. Many courts have determined that the Convention
is not the exclusive means of gathering evidence whenever a foreign
92. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
TO THE SENATE, SEN. ExEC. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323, 323
(1973).
93. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 10:
In executing a Letter of Request the requested authority shall apply the appro-
priate measures of compulsion in the instances and to the same extent as are provided
by its internal law for the execution of orders issued by the authorities of its own
country or of requests made by parties in internal proceedings.
94. Id.
95. Actually, in many cases American courts are not even faced with the reluctance of a
foreign judge to comply with a specific discovery request. The language of the Convention has
provided fertile ground for debate between the parties to the suit before any letter of request is
even issued. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58
(E.D. Pa. 1983). In such cases, it is unclear whether the foreign court will be as uncooperative
as some parties fear.
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party is involved in a suit.96 One possible way to reach this result is
under a waiver theory. This Comment discusses the idea that a for-
eign plaintiff, by filing suit in the United States, has waived any right
to assert the Evidence Convention.
III. THE EVIDENCE CONVENTION IN AMERICAN COURTS
A. Principles of Treaty Supremacy and International Comity
1. Status of treaties in the American legal system
The purpose of any treaty is to facilitate cooperation between na-
tions.97 It is assumed that every treaty has an equitable purpose
which should be given effect when the treaty is interpreted. 98 The
only time construction of the terms of the treaty comes into issue is
when the document is capable of more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion.99 Such is the case with the Evidence Convention, which is writ-
ten in broad terms to accomodate the structures of a number of
judicial systems. Thus, it is not surprising that there are cases in the
American courts which provide conflicting interpretaions of the Con-
vention.c0 The potentially limited scope of discovery under the Con-
vention conflicts with established American ideas of court procedure
and pretrial litigation activities, making courts and parties reluctant
to apply its terms as literally written.101
A treaty is binding upon all of the parties who sign it, and the
96. The Evidence Convention, unlike the Service Convention, does not specifically state
that it is the exclusive means for taking evidence when a foreign party is involved.
For further discussion of the exclusivity of the Convention, see Oxman, The Choice Be-
tween Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the
Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733 (1983); Comment, The Hague Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and
Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1984).
97. A convention has the status of a treaty. See American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d
149, 153 (9th Cit. 1957) (suit involving the interpretation of a tax treaty between the United
States and Great Britain); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d
755, 756 n.1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155, 156 n.l (1981) (defendant automobile manufacturer re-
quested the court to quash the service of a summons which was not served pursuant to the
Hague Service Convention).
98. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)
(suit involving heirs' rights to recover damages following an airplane crash, when the amount
of recovery has been limited by an international convention); see also American Trust Co., 247
F.2d at 152.
99. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (case involving a foreign
widow's heirs' right to American property owned by widow's husband under a 1928 United
States-Honduran treaty).
100. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
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signatories must comply in good faith with its terms. 10 2 Although the
constituent parts of a federal state, such as the individual states in the
United States, may be delegated to enforce parts of a treaty, the ulti-
mate responsibility for applying the document lies with the larger
governmental entity.103 The courts are the organ of government em-
powered to interpret treaties, as they interpret all federal legisla-
tion. 104 Although great weight is given to the opinions of the
President and the Congress, the courts are the ultimate arbiters of
conflicts in treaty interpretation. 10 5 There are various criteria for in-
terpreting a treaty. The courts must take into account the intention of
the government in making the treaty as well as the opinions of the
executive branch.° 6 However, intepretaions of treaties by the federal
courts are binding on the state courts. 0 7 The supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution grants a treaty supremacy over conflicting
state laws. 108 Therefore, the Evidence Convention has supremacy
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 138 (1965) ("An international agreement is binding in accordance with its terms and
each party has a duty to give them effect, except to the extent that they may be unlawful under
the rule stated in § 116."). Comment u to § 138 explains:
The rule stated in this Section is frequently referred to as pacta sunt servanda. If an
orderly system of international legal relations is going to be effective it must have as a
postulate that the parties to an international agreement commit themselves in good
faith to carry out its terms. This has been recognized from the beginning of the
development of international law.
Accord RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324
(Tent. Draft No. 1 1980). Cf. Performance Industries v. Honda Motor Co., No. 83-4863, slip
op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 1985) (available on LEXIS) ("Although the United States may have
agreed to be bound by the terms of the [Evidence] Convention, Japan has not, and I will not
provide the defendants with the 'protections' of the Convention when Japan has not chosen to
do so.").
103. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324
comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1 1980).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 150 (1965) ("Under the law of the United States, courts in the United States have
exclusive authority to interpret an international agreement to which the United States is a
party for the purpose of applying it in litigation as the domestic law of the United States.").
Accord RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 333 &
comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1 1980).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 149, 150, 151, 152 (1965).
106. Id. §§ 151-52; accord RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 334 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1980).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 141, 144 (1965); see L. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 167-71
(1978).
108. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
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over any conflicting state discovery rule.
Although these principles of international law may seem
straightforward, there are still a number of problems and complicat-
ing factors which affect the way in which the Evidence Convention is
interpreted. Because the language of the treaty is often vague, a
number of plausible interpretations may be made for each section of
the document. In addition, it is not always clear to the courts
whether the provisions of the treaty are in direct conflict with local
procedures, or whether they have a choice as to which set of rules to
follow. °9 In the latter circumstance, courts often choose familiar lo-
cal practices before resorting to the Convention.110
The policies behind the supremacy clause and general principles
of treaty interpretation are clear. International relations, in order to
be peaceful and forceful, require a broad national policy, not piece-
meal decisions by individual states. 1 ' In United States v. Pink,"12 a
case involving seizure of United States property owned by Soviets, the
Supreme Court dealt with the conflict between state law and treaties.
The Court reiterated that "state law must yield when it is inconsistent
with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty."" 3 The Court
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Cf. 65 OP. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 210, 210-12 (1982) (a treaty "properly acceded to by the United
States. . . supersedes any inconsistent provision of state law even though the state is other-
wise clearly authorized to act in the premises. (United States v. Pink, supra 315 U.S. at 230-
231; United States v. Belmont (1937) 301 U.S. 324, 331-322 [sic].)").
Some of the earliest cases interpreting the treaty came from the California Court of Ap-
peal. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 787, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982). These cases concluded that the Evidence Convention is the primary
means for obtaining evidence from foreign parties. Some courts have suggested that the Cali-
fornia courts were reluctant to enforce state discovery practices in place of a federal treaty.
Federal judges may be less hesitant to apply the Federal Rules instead of the Convention
because of the equality between federal laws and treaties. Laker Airways v. Pan American
World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 50 (D.C. 1984).
109. Several courts have tried to analyze the issue of the exclusivity of the Convention on
the basis of which law was passed by Congress last, the treaty or the Federal Rules. The last
conflicting piece of legislation passed by Congress supersedes existing statutes. Since the Fed-
eral Rules were revised following the acceptance of the Convention, this analysis has not satis-
factorily answered the question for most courts which have addressed the issue. In re
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 608 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985).
110. Cf COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 55.
111. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1949) (dispute arose between the United
States and New York over title to assets formerly held by the Russian government).
112. Id.
113. Id See generally 65 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 210, 211-12 (1982).
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noted, however, that treaties "will be carefully construed so as not to
derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this na-
tion unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.""14 As
a consequence, although treaties are the federal common law,'1 5 and
are superior to the law of the states," 6 leeway will be given to state
law when possible. The two systems of legislation need not be incon-
sistent; they may exist together allowing individual litigants and
courts to incorporate both laws for the most effective course of action.
Consequently, when treaties are interpreted broadly, courts may not
find that the treaty is the exclusive and final word on the law in that
area. The court may seek ways in which to harmonize potential con-
flicts and choose the course that is the most practical and fair to all
parties in light of the facts of the case.
2. The judicial sovereignty of the foreign court
Even if a court determines that a state procedure or the Federal
Rules is not inconsistent with the Convention, the court may decide
to require the use of the Convention out of respect for the sovereignty
of the foreign court over its own nationals. Most courts are very pro-
tective of their judicial sovereignty and hesitate to grant requests
which sharply conflict with their established principles of litigation.' 1 7
One of the earliest cases addressing these issues was Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court,'1 8 a products liability action by
an American plaintiff against a German corporation. In that decision,
the court denied certain discovery orders because they "would impair
the powers of the Federal Republic of Germany to control the prop-
erty and personnel of an entity which it has created and which has
114. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
115. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 4-4, 167-71 (1978).
116. Id; see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 231.
117. Comment, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in US. Antitrust Litigation Re-
cent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 748 (1974) (footnotes omitted):
The dilemma for American courts has been to accommodate the conflicting
principles of lexfori and effective enforcement, on the one hand, and concepts of due
process and international comity, on the other. The gradual trend over the last fif-
teen years seems to have been towards a preference for the former, "enforcement"
norm. There is, however, some weighty authority for proponents of the due process-
comity position.
118. 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1973). This case was decided before Ger-
many ratified the Convention. The analysis the court uses in regard to the established proce-
dures between the United States and Germany at that time is pertinent to later Hague
Evidence Convention cases, and is often cited by other courts.
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never left its protection."' 19 Thus, despite the "generous provisions of
the California discovery statutes," notions of international comity, it
was held, require courts to avoid encroaching upon the sovereignty of
another court system. 120
This strict view of judicial sovereignty is not always respected
with the same conviction, however. In a recent district court opinion,
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,121 the court held
that the American plaintiff had to comply with the provisions of the
Evidence Convention. In this products liability case, the court dis-
agreed with the argument that "this treaty does not represent the ex-
clusive means of gathering evidence abroad but rather was intended
merely to supplement the less restrictive means provided by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure."'122 Plaintiff in that case cited article 27
of the Convention, which permits a "contracting state" to use its own
internal law or practice for taking evidence.123 The court found this
language vague and "not conclusive," but nevertheless held that prin-
ciples of international relations and comity required a more restrictive
interpretation of the Convention.124 One court cannot "foist its legal
procedures upon another.' 1 25 Interestingly, the court then went on to
hold that if the plaintiffs could not get the cooperation or discovery
they needed through the Evidence Convention, they could then return
to the court for further discovery orders. 26 Since the foreign defend-
119. Id. at 508, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
120. Id. One possible approach is to require both sides to proceed under the Evidence
Convention. See Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 236, 240,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 877-78 (1982). Whenever discovery is taken on foreign soil, this would
make sense. It will not assist, however, an American party with all of its offices and assets in
this country. To try to limit the amount of discovery taken here to conform with the limita-
tions met abroad would be virtually impossible. The courts would have a difficult time draw-
ing a line between acceptable discovery and requests which are too broad. In view of the
strong policy in this country in favor of discovery and the Federal Rules, furthermore, any
such result would be as inequitable as the system as it now stands might become.
This same issue of exclusivity has arisen with respect to the Service Convention. Compare
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (court held that service pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 was acceptable, even if it did not comply with Hague Service
Convention), with Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177
Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981) (court held that plaintiffs must comply with the Convention, and
quashed service by local rule). See also Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d
808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
121. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 61.
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ant is doing business in the jurisdiction of the court, the court rea-
soned, it is always subject to any discovery orders issuing from that
court. 27 Although the court states that it wishes to respect the rights
and position of the foreign court, it then goes on to say that it will
overlook the Convention if it does not provide the results it seeks.
This arguably shows even less respect for the foreign court, because
the judge is only willing to cooperate and respect the foreign court's
decision if his requests are fully complied with.
A number of courts have determined that, contrary to the Cali-
fornia cases, ordering discovery pursuant to American rules does not
violate foreign sovereignty. These decisions are often based upon the
notion that the Evidence Convention is only operable when evidence
is physically located abroad. Several courts have taken a very restric-
tive view of how much evidence is located abroad.1 28 If a corporation
has offices in the United States or does substantial business here, the
court may find that document requests can be fufilled within the ju-
risdiction of the United States, and therefore they refuse to apply the
Evidence Convention.129 Even if the foreign party asserts that the
documents would have to be sent over from abroad, some courts have
held that sending over the documents would merely be an act prepar-
atory to discovery, and therefore it was not necessary to go through
the judicial channels required by the Evidence Convention.13 0 Simi-
larly, if a deposition is set in the United States or if interrogatories are
most likely to be answered by American counsel, some courts have
held that there is no need to resort to the Convention, and instead
follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
13
1
The courts in these cases reason that the Evidence Convention is
concerned with respecting the sovereignty of the foreign court, and
not to protect the parties to the suit. 132 If discovery is conducted on
American soil, and the jurisdictional boundaries of the foreign court
are never invaded, that court's sovereignty is not violated.133 Because
127. Id.
128. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985).
129. Id.
130. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 (N.D. Il. 1984) (patent infringe-
ment suit; defendant was ordered to comply with discovery requests which did not intrude on
French soil); Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80-1911, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 1984) (available on LEXIS) (French defendant's motion for a protective order against
"American-style" discovery denied).
131. See In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 611 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985).
132. See infra note 169.
133. These arguments do not, however, solve the dilemma over foreign nonparty witnesses
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the American court has jurisdiction over the parties, the argument
continues, it can order them to comply with any provision of the Fed-
eral Rules.134 This argument can, however, be criticized for failing to
recognize a foreign court's interest in protecting the rights of its own
nationals. The response to that criticism is that American discovery
procedures may be part of the cost of doing business in the United
States. 135
B. Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties
A foreign corporation becomes a proper defendant to a suit and
subject to the jurisdiction of American courts when it has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state to make it amenable to the laws of
that state.13 6 Personal jurisdiction is, however, "a waivable defect,
over whom the American court does not have jurisdiction; presumably, the Evidence Conven-
tion would have to be applied to depose any such individual if they do not voluntarily come to
the United States.
134. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985).
135. In a related context, American courts have not always hesitated to require a foreign
party to comply with a discovery request which another nation may object to. In Societe
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, the Supreme Court addressed the
question whether a foreign plaintiff should be required to comply with a discovery request
when the production of the documents sought may result in a violation of Swiss law. 357 U.S.
197, 205 (1958). Societe involved a Swiss holding corporation trying to recover assets which
were confiscated by the American government under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The
Court decided that "United States courts should be free to require claimants of seized assets
who face legal obstacles under the laws of their own countries to make all such efforts [at
discovery] to the maximum of their ability." Id. The Court noted that, if the foreign plaintiff
does not or cannot comply, "[t]his is not to say that petitioner will profit." Id. The Court
stated that since the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion on the issues, failure to produce the
documents may hurt its own case, and thus the Court determined that noncompliance should
affect only the adequacy of the plaintiff's proof, and not preclude the case from court. Id. at
213. Although Societe is a pre-Evidence Convention case, the Court at that time clearly fa-
vored good faith attempts at compliance with discovery orders on the part of foreign plaintiffs.
See id. at 205-06. Having brought their suit in American courts, documents within the "con-
trol" of the plaintiff were subject to discovery. Id. at 204-05. Lower courts have differed in
their application of Societe. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir.
1960).
136. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
A troublesome issue arises when the court sanctions a party who refuses to produce dis-
covery documents needed to prove the court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction. For a
discussion of these issues, see Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery Sanctions in a Jurisdictional
Context: Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 32 U.
KAN. L. REv. 471 (1984); Comment, Discovery-Power to Impose Sanctions for Failure to
Make Discovery on Jurisdictional Issues, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 109 (1982); Note, Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Company of North America: Personal Jurisdiction Estab-
lished by Sanction, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 837 (1982).
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which must be asserted by the party who would take advantage of
it.' ' 137 When a foreign corporation files a suit or asserts a counter-
claim, it waives any objection it may have had to in personam juris-
diction.'38 By agreeing to be subject to the laws of the state as a
plaintiff or counterclaimant, does the foreign plaintiff or counter-
claimant then agree to become subject to local discovery rules?139 Ap-
plying the philosophy of the drafters of the Convention that the
Convention should be construed liberally as a minimum standard of
cooperation, and noting the emphasis toward complying with all rea-
sonable discovery requests which is apparent in a number of recent
cases, 140 it would appear that foreign corporations may lose their right
to argue that the Evidence Convention and not local discovery rules
apply to them. Once a party becomes subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion, there is evidence that they may become subject to all local proce-
dural rules, including discovery practices, instead of the more
restrictive Evidence Convention.
A number of cases, some very recent, have touched on the effect
of the court's jurisdiction on the rights of the parties. The 1973 Volks-
wagenwerk case declared that courts "have no jurisdiction over per-
137. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 19 (3d ed. 1976), citing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) and Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co., 350 U.S. 495
(1956).
138. See generally id.
139. In an analagous context, a state can consent to the jurisdiction of an American court
by bringing suit in that court, and waive any right to claim sovereign immunity. National City
Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 363 (1955). In National City Bank, the
Republic of China brought suit to recover funds placed in an account with defendant bank.
National City Bank then filed two counterclaims seeking affirmative relief. China argued that
the counterclaims invaded its sovereign immunity. The Court disagreed. According to the
majority, the situation involved "a foreign government invoking our law but resisting a claim
against it which fairly would curtail its recovery. It wants our law, like any other litigant, but
it wants our law free from the claims of justice." Id. 348 U.S. at 361-62. See also Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1982).
This argument is even stronger in a case involving discovery against a foreign commercial
enterprise instead of a foreign government. Even under the theory of sovereign immunity, an
exception is made to the doctrine when the foreign state commits a tort or carries on a com-
mercial enterprise as well as whenever the government waives the right, either explicitly or by
implication. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982).
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,317, 18,323 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985), the court states that "[e]ven foreign govern-
ments may be sued in American courts for actions undertaken in their commercial capacity in
the United States [citations omitted], and, if amenable to United States substantive law, are
presumably also subject in those proceedings to American procedural law." See also In re
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 604-05 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985).
140. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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sons or property outside their territory."141 The 1981
Volkswagenwerk court, however, held that "[o]nce a foreign corpora-
tion is properly subject to a court's jurisdiction, it (like any other
party validly joined in a local lawsuit) may with technical propriety be
ordered to act or to refrain from acting, in matters relevant to the
lawsuit, at places outside the state."1 42 Thus, the court held, the in-
ternal affairs of the foreign corporation are subject to the orders of a
California court, as long as the corporation is properly a party to the
suit. 1 43 The court went on to say that the law of the forum governs
procedural matters.'" Finally, the court determined that if a court
has personal jurisdiction over a party, that party must comply with
discovery procedures which are essential parts of that court's jurisdic-
tion, on pain of default.'
45
Nevertheless, although the court did not question its power to
issue any discovery order, as a matter of judicial restraint, the 1981
Volkswagenwerk court determined that the plaintiff must proceed pur-
suant to the Convention. 14 Thus, if a foreign defendant is subject to
the court's jurisdiction and therefore its procedures, it follows that a
foreign plaintiff who files suit in an American court, thereby waiving
any objection to jurisdiction, should also be required to follow local
court procedure, including local discovery rules. If the foreign party
is willing to subject itself to the American judicial system, the foreign
court cannot object, especially if discovery is conducted here.
Two recent federal district court cases approached this issue but
reached somewhat different conclusions. In Schroeder v. Lufthansa
German Airlines,147 the court agreed that when a foreign party joins a
141. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
142. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84. But see Oxman, supra note 96, at
739-44. Oxman argues that jurisdiction alone is not a strong enough rationale for compelling
discovery from a foreign defendant.
143. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
144. Id. at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
145. Id. at 857-58, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884:
That VWAG should have been chartered by, and should maintain its manufacturing
facility in, a jurisdiction which would regard these California discovery orders as
violations of its sovereignty seems happenstance so far as the California action is
concerned: A strong argument can be made that as a legitimate party to a California
action VWAG may be required to elect between the demands of the California court
and the sensitivities of the West German Government, and to risk the sanctions au-
thorized by California law should it elect not to give the required discovery.
See also Coopman v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 656, 660, 47 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1965).
146. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 858-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
147. Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
15, 1983).
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suit in the United States and does not contest jurisdiction, that party
may then be required to conform to local procedural rules.148 The
court goes on to say, however, that apart from these technical rules of
jurisdiction, the court should exercise self-restraint in discovery mat-
ters. 49 Principles of international comity require the court to adopt
more restrictive discovery measures pursuant to the Evidence Con-
vention, even when other principles of law would allow local rules to
govern the situation.1
5 0
In Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.,151 the district court
stated outright that federal jurisdiction over a foreign party subjects
that litigant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 152 In Lasky, a
products liability action, the foreign defendant asked that all discov-
ery requests be made pursuant to the Evidence Convention.1 53 The
court determined, however, that the plaintiffs should be allowed to
pursue their discovery request. 154 The court found that the defendant
should be subject to general local discovery provisions. 155 A contrary
result, the judge held, "would severely restrict the plaintiffs' scope of
discovery," because the German ratification of the Convention speci-
fied that pretrial discovery requests would not be honored.156 This
court, therefore, directly seeks documents which the foreign nation
says through the Convention it does not wish to produce.
Schroeder and Lasky illustrate the courts' disagreement regard-
ing principles of personal jurisdiction and the effect courts' jurisdic-
tional rights have over the choice of procedure to be followed: local
or Evidence Convention. The 1981 Volkswagenwerk case and Schroe-
der acknowledge that standard principles of law might allow them to
compel discovery under the local rules rather than under the Conven-
tion. Both courts go on to say that there are other principles the court
should take into account when applying these priniciples to formulate
a discovery order. Ideals of international comity may require a degree
of judicial self-restraint.157
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
152. Id. at 1228.
153. Id.
154. Id. "The existence of federal jurisdiction over a foreign entity subjects that entity,
like any other litigant, to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1229.
157. Id. at 1228.
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Nevertheless, the courts recognize their power to enforce the lo-
cal rules, and several courts have applied them. In re Anschuetz &
Co. 158 is the only federal court of appeals decision to discuss the exclu-
sivity of the Evidence Convention. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held
that "the Hague Convention does not supplant the application of the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules over foreign, Hague Con-
vention state nationals, subject to in personam jurisdiction in a United
States [c]ourt."1 59 The court then states that, "[h]aving been found
reachable under the Louisiana long-arm statute, Anschuetz is subject
to the Federal Rules discovery provisions.' '1 60 Ultimately, plaintiffs
had to employ the Evidence Convention in order to take the involun-
tary deposition of a party in the foreign country, but any evidence
gathered in the United States could be requested through the Federal
Rules. 161
In the vast majority of Evidence Convention cases officially re-
ported, the Evidence Convention is raised by foreign defendants.
Although the courts have split on their approach as to whether the
Evidence Convention is the exclusive means of obtaining discovery
from foreign defendants, certain issues continue to arise. Courts em-
phasize their jurisdiction over the parties to the suit. Their concern
with compliance with the Convention often arises only when depo-
nents and documents are actually located abroad. Yet, even in these
situations, and even when foreign law may subject a party to penalties
for complying with the discovery request,1 62 courts have required at
least a good faith effort at compliance.
In the case of a plaintiff who brings suit, the arguments in favor
158. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
159. Id.
160. Id. The parties may then raise the challenge of documents and witnesses located
abroad. In the case of a corporation, at least, courts have held that a witness may not "resist
the production of documents on the ground that the documents are located abroad. [Citations
omitted.] The test for the production of documents is control, not location. [Citation omit-
ted.]" Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983) (foreign defendant sought relief from a contempt sanction for failing to pro-
duce documents subpoenaed by the grand jury). See also United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968) (grand jury subpoena requiring defendant Bank to
produce documents located at a branch office in Germany); McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear
Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("Arguably at least, the Evidence Conven-
tion has no application at all to the production, in this country, by a party within the jurisdic-
tion of this court, of evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
161. See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 524 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (plaintiff did
not have to comply with Evidence Convention for discovery located in the United States).
162. See supra note 135.
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of the use of the Federal Rules is even stronger. In such a case, plain-
tiffs are not unwilling participants in the American judicial process,
brought into court on the basis of "minimum contacts." Here, plain-
tiffs are aware, beforehand, of the procedures and effort expected of
them by the courts. Although this alone does not answer the question
of the sovereignty of the foreign court, it seems that if the party is
willing to waive any objection it may have to suit, 163 and waive its
ability to choose a foreign court to litigate where they will be pro-
tected from broad discovery requests, 164 then the interests of the for-
eign court are lessened, and the threat to its sovereignty is reduced. 165
C. Waiver of Rights Under the Evidence Convention
Personal jurisdiction over a party alone may not be a sufficient
basis for applying local discocvery rules in place of the Evidence Con-
vention. In addition, the location of the evidence sought may not al-
ways provide the best answer to the question of the exclusivity of the
Evidence Convention. One possible theory to apply to the exclusivity
issue is that of waiver.
163. Courts have differed in their approach to the timing of the foreign defendant's raising
of the Evidence Convention as the appropriate method for making discovery requests. Com-
pare Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
that defendant waived its right to assert the Evidence Convention because they did not seek
relief at the time the discovery request was made, but instead chose to ignore discovery re-
quests), with Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. 1983):
I find no merit in plaintiff's argument that [defendant] is estopped from asserting the
applicability of the Hague Convention because it served discovery requests upon
plaintiff pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than by the conven-
tion procedure. The convention is at issue only when a litigant from a signatory
country seeks evidence in another signatory country other than where the case is
pending. [Defendant's] request did not seek to take any evidence abroad. It was
directed to a party residing in the country where the litigation was initiated.
164. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik and Rextrusion Systems, 101
F.R.D. 360 (D. Ver. 1984). In Murphy, the defendant objected to the interrogatories and
request to produce propounded by plaintiff. Defendant waited three years before it began to
request compliance with the Evidence Convention. Id. at 360. The court held that plaintiff
did not have to proceed under the Evidence Convention; because of the American court's
strong interest in quickly resolving the case, principles of comity did not preclude use of the
local rules:
The United States has a clear interest in facilitating the manner in which foreign
citizens doing business in the United States are available for litigation here. West
Germany has a clear interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial rights and
procedures, but we find that interest less compelling in this instance than, for exam-
ple, where a non-party witness is sought for deposition or where the scope of discov-
ery sought involves more intrusive methods.
Id. at 363.
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Like personal jurisdiction, litigants can and do waive rights they
may otherwise assert. Once a party agrees to be bound to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, that party agrees to be bound by the court's decision
and its procedures.1 66 Once waived, the right cannot be reclaimed.
Traditionally, the procedural law of the forum has controlled in
any lawsuit.1 67 Many of the recent decisions of the courts seem to
recognize this principle, although some choose not to demand use of
local rules because of a strong belief in judicial self-restraint and
comity.
When a party agrees to become bound to the powers of the
courts of one nation, it also agrees to be bound by its procedural
law.168 This analysis does not destroy the force and purpose of the
Evidence Convention. The Convention still provides an effective
means for gathering evidence abroad which is not otherwise available
in the United States. As long as discovery is conducted in the United
States, the foreign court's sovereignty is not violated.1 69 If a foreign
plaintiff refuses to comply with a discovery request, the court can ap-
ply sanctions. Without this power, a foreign plaintiff has a great ad-
vantage over a United States defendant: the plaintiff can choose his
forum, and have the advantages of both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure against his opponent and his own nation's limits on
discovery.
166. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 604-05 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985); Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,317, 18,323 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1984).
167. It might be argued that article 9 of the Convention, by stating that local procedures
should be followed by the executing state unless a contrary and feasible procedural request is
made by the requesting state, recognizes the strength of local discovery rules. This article can
also be read, however, as merely applying to the form of the request and answer, and not the
substance. This is especially clear considering that article 23, the prohibition against pretrial
discovery, has been adopted by so many signatories.
168. See supra note 166.
169. One court has pointed out that it is the foreign court, and not the litigant, which has
the authority to waive sovereignty over evidence located abroad. Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG
v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 236, 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1982). Absent a party
to the suit violating a foreign law, however, this overlooks the party's control over any docu-
ments in his possession, plus, in the case of a foreign plaintiff, his ability to choose the site for
the trial. While the documents may not be gathered through judicial channels abroad, if the
foreign entity has sufficient contacts to file suit in an United States court, then presumably it
has sufficient contacts to produce documents or answer interrogatories here. Even in situations
where foreign law may be violated if documents are produced, American courts have been very
reluctant to excuse anything less than a good faith effort on the part of the foreign party to
comply with reasonable discovery requests.
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IV. SANCTIONS
Many of the cases cited have suggested that discovery should be
attempted under the provisions of the Convention if at all possible.
The next problem lies in when and what sanctions to apply for those
who do not comply with discovery orders under the Convention or
under local rules. Article 10 of the Convention allows for methods of
compulsion under the executing country's law for those who do not
comply with the Convention itself1 70
If the trial court issues an order on its own, not pursuant to the
Evidence Convention, compliance may be difficult and sanctions may
be impossible. It is unlikely that a foreign court will impose sanctions
for an order it did not execute, so resort to the foreign party's home
forum offers little hope. Enforcement, therefore, lies with the Ameri-
can court. The cases suggest alternatives to article 10. In the 1973
Volkswagenwerk case, the court noted that noncompliance may result
in a default judgment.' 7' In another context, the Court in Societe In-
ternationale pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers rejects the ex-
treme default judgment, and suggests that other sanctions would be
appropriate if one party did not comply. 72 In that case, however, the
Court pointed out that the lack of evidence would hurt the foreign
plaintiff (since the foreign plaintiff had the burden of proof) and that
this was a type of sanction imposed on the noncomplying party. 7 3 In
some of these cases, it may be difficult to acquire the assets of the
sanctioned party to pay the other side. The theory is that if the for-
eign entities have sufficient contacts with the state for jurisdiction,
they can be expected to comply with state law. 174 Once jurisdiction is
170. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 10. For text of article 10, see supra note 93.
171. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
172. 357 U.S; 197, 212 (1958).
173. Id at 212-13.
174. Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
The forum non conveniens cases use an analagous line of reasoning. In these cases the
court must decide if the case should be tried in its jurisdiction, or dismissed to be litigated in a
foreign court. The availability of evidence is a large consideration in these cases. An alien
plaintiff makes himself amenable to the court system by filing suit. See generally Note, The
Convenient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1967). In the area of forum non conveniens
decisions, some courts have retained jurisdiction over "nominally 'alien' plaintiffs." Id. at 71.
If the plaintiff is an "essentially American enterprise," a United States court may refuse to
dismiss a case in favor of a foreign court. Id In Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.
Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the courts were wary that
American shipowners were trying to block suits by calling themselves foreign corporations.
Id. at 889. The court there retained jurisdiction. Id. In Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande
Oil Co., 236 F. Supp. 362 (D. Del. 1965), rev'd, 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
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established, the court also has jurisdiction to impose certain specific
sanctions.
Many cases emphasize a need to apply the Evidence Convention
as a first option, and then apply sanctions for noncompliance with the
treaty provisions. Many courts advocate a balancing approach on a
case-by-case basis. 175 If the court applies local or federal procedures,
the full range of sanctions is available to them for failures to comply.
If a party invokes the legal and equitable powers of the American
court, then arguably they should be fully aware and subject to that
court's enforcement powers as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The Evidence Convention provides a procedural framework with
which the signatory nations can structure foreign discovery requests.
Because different attitudes exist toward discovery in the several signa-
tory nations, actual use of the Convention varies. American courts
U.S. 945 (1966), and Constructora Ordaz, N.V. v. Orinoco Mining Co., 262 F. Supp. 91 (D.
Del. 1966), the connection between the corporation and the United States was even more
tenuous than it was in Chemical, but the courts nevertheless refused to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds. The courts held that the suits were actually between two Americans, and,
therefore, should be conducted in United States courts. (For a discussion of these cases, see
Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad, supra, at 71-72).
These cases all face the problem of what is an "essentially American" enterprise. These
principles relate to the issue in this Comment. If the contacts of the foreign party are sufficient
to bring them into American courts, they may be sufficient to allow the courts to exercise their
full jurisdictional powers over the litigants, including discovery requests. If a foreign manufac-
turer sells a large quantity of goods in the United States, even though they are manufactured
abroad, does that place the manufacturer in such a position within the American economy that
he should be subject to local process and procedures? Such a requirement may be the reason-
able and logical result of their sales and contacts within the local court's area of jurisdiction. In
Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court decided that. the
case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. One of the concerns of the court
was that litigation in the United States would require the parties to obtain evidence through
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Convention, and both sources were so
limited that the parties could not effectively litigate the suit here. Id. at 788-89. The court
feared that foreign courts may withhold evidence altogether, or provide it in such a limited
form that the parties could not conduct a "full-fledged American-style" discovery process. Id.
In addition, they found costs to be so high, that it would be better to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction where the evidence would be more readily available and the parties would be on
more equal footing. Id. In Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D.
58 (E.D. Pa. 1983), after a strong statement that international comity required the American
party to comply with the Evidence Convention, the court then stated that any problems which
arise under the Convention could later be addressed to the American court because the foreign
company is still subject to the American court's jurisdiction.
175. Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App. 3d 787, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Philadelphia, 100
F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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will honor almost all discovery requests. Foreign courts, in contrast,
may not grant American pretrial discovery orders which are incom-
patible with their legal systems.17 6 The consequences of these differ-
ences are felt when an American party to a suit is subject to liberal
evidence gathering, while that same party is limited in the scope of its
discovery against the foreign party. This creates inequity in the court
proceedings.
Several arguments can be made for prohibiting an alien plaintiff
or counterclaimant from invoking the restricted rights under the Evi-
dence Convention. The very terms of the treaty do not necessarily
prohibit the use of standard American discovery procedures. 177 In ad-
dition, it can be argued that by subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, the foreign plaintiff fully submits itself to the local legal
system and waives any rights it may have under the Convention or
under foreign law. Although a foreign court may ultimately thwart
attempts at pretrial discovery and decide that sovereignty is too im-
portant to permit what it considers intrusive document and witness
requests, American courts up to this point have often been anxious for
foreign parties to comply with all requests. The safest route seems to
be to require a good faith effort under the Evidence Convention for
discovery actually conducted abroad. Failing that, an uncooperative
foreign party can arguably be subjected to the liberal local discovery
rules, or face sanctions.
Marilyn A. Monahan
176. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 A.C. 547, [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81, [1978] 1 Al E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977).
177. Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 10; In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
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